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THE TIME BETWEEN THE THEFT AND THE INJURY: STANDING 
REQUIREMENTS BASED ON A FUTURE RISK OF IDENTITY 
THEFT AFTER A DATA BREACH 
Jameson Steffel 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A single data breach has the ability to affect billions of accounts at one 
time.1 In 2018 alone, data breaches exposed over 446 million consumer 
records containing personally identifiable information (“PII”).2 Although 
the numbers may already seem staggering, some believe the risk will 
likely increase and worsen going forward as reliance on online record 
keeping increases.3 Unsurprisingly, as data breaches occur, victims bring 
lawsuits, hoping to remedy damages. Corporate spending on class action 
lawsuits has increased to its highest level since 2008.4 Within the trend, 
many in the field believe data privacy and security will bring the next 
wave of class action suits.5  
As the legal attention surrounding data and security has increased, 
federal courts are split on when a victim of a data breach has standing to 
sue in federal court. Federal courts generally agree that someone whose 
identity was stolen and wrongfully used after their PII was exposed in a 
data breach has standing to sue.6 However, federal courts are split over 
whether risk of future identity theft alone is enough to grant standing in 
 
 1. Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affect by 2013 Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yahoo-hack-3-billion-
users.html?module=inline.  
 2. IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT 2 (2019), 
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ITRC_2018-End-of-Year-
Aftermath_FINAL_V2_combinedWEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/AMA7-PC8E]. 
 3. Brue Schneier, Opinion, Internet Hacking Is About to Get Much Worse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/opinion/internet-hacking-cybersecurity-iot.html.  
 4. CARLTON FIELDS, 2019 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES IN 
REDUCING COST AND MANAGING RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 7 (2019), 
https://gallery.mailchimp.com/0c82d1e732eec64ff4cb3d4b7/files/d46d1d29-390d-48ec-ac98-
50c7e8600edc/2019_Class_Action_Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/927U-P55R]. 
 5. Id. at 13 (“More than half of legal decision-makers responsible for class actions believe data 
privacy and security will be the next wave of class actions, up from less than 30 percent in 2017.”). 
 6. See Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc. (In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 
884 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2018) (District court separated the plaintiffs into two classes: plaintiffs who 
“alleged that they had already suffered financial losses from identity theft” and those who had not already 
suffered damages. On appeal, parties only contested whether the second group of plaintiffs lacked 
standing. The Ninth Circuit seemed to agree there were not questions regarding standing for the first group 
of plaintiffs); See also, Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Nobody doubts that 
identity theft, should it befall one of these plaintiffs, would constitute a[n] . . . injury.”).  
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federal courts.7 
This Article explores the aforementioned split and focuses on how two 
recent cases have interpreted previous decisions on either side of the split. 
Further, based on the recent rulings, this Article argues that the split may 
be harmonized. Part II of this Article first sets forth the framework of the 
standing doctrine. Next, Part II discusses two Supreme Court decisions, 
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA8 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,9 that relate 
directly to the standing doctrine and the current circuit split, along with 
other background cases necessary for fully understanding the circuit split. 
Part III compares two recent cases involved in the circuit split: Beck v. 
Mcdonald10 and AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. 
Breach Litig.).11 Part IV argues that although Beck and AFGE fall on 
opposite sides of the circuit split, together the cases illustrate that federal 
courts have generally come to agreement on what factors are the most 
important when deciding whether to grant standing for plaintiffs alleging 
risk of future identity theft. Further, Part IV also proposes a framework 
for courts to use that harmonizes the holdings of these different cases. 
Finally, Part V concludes by summarizing the above issues and 
advocating that, moving forward, courts should follow the simplified 
framework suggested. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This Part first introduces the standing doctrine and then introduces the 
two major Supreme Court cases from the last decade, Clapper and 
Spokeo, which provide guidance to lower courts for determining if 
plaintiffs have standing in data breach cases. Although neither case’s facts 
dealt specifically with a data breach, both cases discussed standing and 
sought to clarify how courts should determine if a plaintiff had suffered 
an injury in fact.  
A.  The Standing Doctrine 
Article III of the United States Constitution grants federal courts with 
“[t]he judicial Powers of the United States,”12 but limits the power to only 
 
 7. AFGE V. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 928 F.3d 42, 58 (D.C. Cir. 
2019). 
 8. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 9. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
 10. 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 11. 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. III §1. 
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“Cases” and “Controversies.”13 “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in 
the traditional understanding of a case or controversy.”14 The idea behind 
a standing requirement is to “prevent the judicial process from being used 
to usurp the powers of the [other] political branches.”15 Therefore, 
plaintiffs must establish the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of 
standing’s three elements.16  
To establish standing, a plaintiff must show (1) the plaintiff suffered an 
injury in fact, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct 
of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed with a 
favorable judicial ruling.17 The first element, injury in fact, must be “(a) 
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ 
or ‘hypothetical.’”18 Many times, the first standing element is the 
prominent issue in data breach suits.19 Lastly, the plaintiff “bears the 
burden of establishing standing” when it invokes federal jurisdiction.20 
Meeting the burden on all three elements of standing allows the case to 
be heard before the court.  
B.  Clapper v. Amnesty International21  
Clapper dealt with a facial constitutional challenge to a new 
amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(“FISA”).22  More specifically, the plaintiffs sought to declare FISA 
§1881a unconstitutional23. Essentially, FISA §1881a allowed the 
government to more easily authorize foreign intelligence surveillance 
without the traditional requirements of probable cause and similar 
constraints.24 The plaintiffs were comprised of “organizations whose 
work allegedly require[d] them to engage in sensitive and sometimes 
privileged” communications with individuals who they believed to be 
 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. III §2. 
 14. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
 15. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). 
 16. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  
 17. Id. at 560, 561.  
 18. Id. 
 19. See Infra. Parts II, III.  
 20. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 412.  
 21. 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
 22. Id. at 407. 
 23. Id. at 404. 
 24. Id. at 405. (“Amendment Act . . . creat[es] a new framework under which the Government may 
seek the FISC’s authorization of certain foreign intelligence surveillance targeting the communications of 
non-US persons located abroad. Unlike traditional FISA surveillance, §1881a does not require the 
Government to demonstrate probable cause that the target [of surveillance] is a foreign power or agent … 
does not require the Government to specify the nature and location of … surveillance.”). 
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“likely targets of surveillance under [FISA] §1881a.”25 The plaintiffs’ two 
main arguments were (1) “there [was] an objectively reasonable 
likelihood that their communications [would] be acquired under §1881a 
at some point in the future, thus causing them injury” and (2) the “risk of 
surveillance” was “so substantial” the plaintiffs were “forced to take 
costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality.”26  
Initially, the district court held that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing.27 Then, on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district 
court’s decision and agreed with the plaintiffs that there was an 
objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications would be 
intercepted.28 The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s finding, 
siding with the government in a 5-4 decision.29 
The Court first ruled on the standing doctrine by taking issue with the 
Second Circuit’s belief that “an objectively reasonable likelihood” of 
future harm was sufficient to establish standing.30 Instead, the Court 
reiterated that the “well-established requirement”31 for standing when 
dealing with a future threated injury was that the injury must be “certainly 
impending.”32 An objectively reasonable likelihood was considered too 
low of a bar for standing.33 
Further, the Court continued that the premise of the plaintiffs’ 
argument rested on “a highly attenuated chain of possibilities” that relied 
on independent actors making independent choices, of which the 
plaintiffs could only speculate.34 This speculative chain of possibilities 
further prevented the plaintiffs from satisfying the second element of 
standing (i.e., that an injury in fact was fairly traceable to FISA §1881a).35  
Lastly, in Clapper the Court also found issue with the plaintiffs’ 
alternative argument.36 The plaintiffs believed they had established 
standing and an injury in fact because they were forced to suffer costs and 
burdens in an effort to avoid FISA §1881a surveillance.37 Instead, the 
Court clarified that the party bringing the action “cannot manufacture 
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of 
 
 25. Id. at 406. 
 26. Id. at 407. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 422. 
 30. Id. at 410. 
 31. Id. at 401. 
 32. Id. at 410. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 411, 412. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 415. 
 37. Id. at 415, 416.  
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hypothetical future harm.”38 Effectively, the reasoning circles back to 
whether the threat of injury passes the “certainly impending” test. If it 
does not, then a plaintiff will not have standing because the injury cannot 
simply be the costs and burdens incurred to avoid a threat that is not 
“certainly impending.” 
Interestingly, in a footnote, the Court noted that its cases “do not 
uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that [plaintiffs are] literally 
certain that the harms they identify will come about.”39 Further, the Court 
stated “[i]n some instances, we have found standing based on a 
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”40 Later, in Susan B. Anthony 
List v. Driehaus41 (“SBA List”), the Court treated both the “certainly 
impending” and “substantial risk” test as valid.42 Moreover, the Court in 
SBA List seemed to rely on the substantial risk test.43  
Since SBA List and Clapper, some courts have suggested the more 
stringent “certainly impending” standard used in Clapper should be 
applied to cases dealing with national security or separation of powers 
issues, as was the case in Clapper.44 Overall, between the two cases, it is 
clear that to pass the standing requirements, the Court will use one of the 
two standards. The substantial risk standard is a lower bar for a plaintiff 
to satisfy.45 Still, the facts and circumstances of the individual case will 
likely determine which standard is used by courts. If the case involves 
national security or other separation of powers issues, it is more likely 
that courts will use the more restrictive “certainly impending” standard, 
but the Court has not specifically clarified this conclusion.   
C.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins46 
The 2016 Supreme Court decision in Spokeo resulted in stricter 
 
 38. Id. at 416.  
 39. Id. at 410, n.5. 
 40. Id.  
 41. 573 U.S. 149 (2014). 
 42. Id. at 158. 
 43. See Bradford C. Mank, Data Breaches Identity Theft, and Article III Standing: Will the 
Supreme Court Resolve the Split in the Circuits, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1323, 1334 (2017). “In Susan 
B. Anthony the Court treated both tests in Clapper as valid . . . [t]he Susan B. Anthony decision appeared 
to rely on the substantial risk test in concluding that ‘the threat of future enforcement of the false statement 
statute [was] substantial.’” Id. (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 164 (2014)).  
 44. Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc. (In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 884 
F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Clapper’s standing analysis was “especially rigorous” because the case 
arose in a sensitive national security context.”).  
 45. Mank, supra note 43, at 1333 (“[T]he Court had sometimes used a less strict “substantial risk” 
test.”). 
 46. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016). 
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requirements for the first element of Article III standing: injury in fact.47 
More specifically, Spokeo required that a plaintiff allege an injury that 
was both “concrete and particularized.”48  
The issue in Spokeo was whether a violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) by Spokeo, Inc. (“Spokeo”) gave the plaintiff 
standing in federal court.49 The FCRA regulates companies that provide 
information about consumers’ credit worthiness and imposes various 
rules regarding the creation and use of consumer reports.50 One of those 
rules is that such agencies must “follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy” of the information they collect and 
produce.51 In its analysis, the Court treated Spokeo as a company 
regulated under the FCRA.52 The plaintiff discovered that the information 
Spokeo reported on his report was inaccurate, which constituted a 
violation under the FCRA.53  
The district court ruled that the plaintiff did not have standing because 
he had not pled an injury in fact.54 The Ninth Circuit then reversed, finding 
that a “violation of a statutory right [was] usually a sufficient injury in 
fact to confer standing.” The Ninth Circuit further noted that there was 
standing because the injury was particularized to the plaintiff 
specifically.55  
The Supreme Court’s analysis focused wholly on the injury in fact 
requirement of standing. Specifically, the Court focused on what the 
“particularized” and “concrete” elements of standing require.56 The Court 
concluded that the “particularized” element meant the injury must be 
personal and in an individualized manner, which means the plaintiff has 
suffered “actual or threatened injury.”57 Importantly for data breach cases, 
the Court included that a “threatened injury” potentially could satisfy the 
“particularized” element. However, the Court emphasized that “concrete” 
and “particularized” are not the same element.58 Instead, the two elements 
have different characteristics, and both are required for a plaintiff to have 
 
 47. Id. at 1545. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 1544. 
 50. Id. at 1545. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1546 (“Spokeo is alleged to qualify as a consumer reporting agency under FCRA.”) 
(internal quotes omitted).  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (“Spokeo violated his statutory rights . . . not just other people[s] . . . because his personal 
interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 56. Id. at 1548.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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standing.59  
The Court continued by defining “concrete” injury as one that “must 
actually exist” and must be “real, and not abstract.”60 The Court also 
stated, however, that concrete does not necessarily mean tangible, and 
instead noted that “intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”61 
Both history62 and Congress play a pivotal role in shaping whether an 
intangible harm creates an injury in fact.63 Congress may elevate an 
intangible harm to the status of being a concrete injury by creating 
statutory law.64 The result is that an intangible harm becomes a de facto 
injury.65 Essentially, a statute can create standing for an otherwise 
intangible harm. However, the Court warned that “a bare procedural 
violation” without any other harm would not satisfy the injury in fact 
requirement of standing.66 Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiff may 
not satisfy the concreteness element by alleging a bare procedural 
violation.67 To illustrate, the Court used the example of an inaccurate zip 
code.68 An inaccurately reported zip code would not alone cause harm to 
a plaintiff, but it still technically would be inaccurate information and 
therefore violate the statute. Although it is a procedural violation, an 
inaccurate zip code would not constitute concrete harm. The Court 
remanded the case and instructed the Ninth Circuit to determine whether 
other types of false information would be considered a concrete harm.69  
Altogether, the Spokeo decision offers guidance on the standing 
jurisprudence in data breach cases in a few different ways. First, the injury 
must be both concrete and particularized. If the individual has personally 
suffered threatened injury, then the individual will likely satisfy the 
“particularized” element. For the concrete element, statutory violations 
help to confer standing for individuals. However, a statutory violation 
must be more than a mere procedural violation. In dealing with future 
harm, the Court suggested that a procedural violation must “entail a 
degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”70 This 
 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. (Internal quotations omitted).  
 61. Id. at 1549. 
 62. History is simply determining whether the harm has traditionally been considered adequate for 
standing. “It is instructive to consider whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a 
harm that has traditionally been regard as providing a basis for a lawsuit in . . . courts.” Id. at 1549. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1550.  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at n.8.  
 70. Id. at 1550.  
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means that the violation itself must at least potentially pose a genuine 
harm to the person. If not, the plaintiff will likely be held not to have 
standing.  
D.  The D.C. Circuit’s Prior Decision Considering Clapper and Spokeo  
Since the Court’s decisions in Clapper and Spokeo, lower federal 
courts remain split on the issue of whether future risk of identity theft is 
sufficient to meet the standing requirements of Article III. Before the 
discussion of the D.C. Circuit’s recent 2019 decision in AFGE v. OPM 
(In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.)71 contained in Part III, 
it is important to understand how the D.C. Circuit decided its first ruling 
that dealt with a future harm of identity theft after the rulings in Clapper 
and Spokeo.  
1.  Attias v. CareFirst, Inc.72 
The Attias case arose out of a cyberattack against health insurer 
CareFirst, Inc.73 In the cyberattack, customers’ personal information was 
breached after CareFirst allegedly failed to encrypt its customer data.74 
The plaintiffs’ causes of action included, inter alia, violations of various 
state statutes, negligence, and breach of contract.75 The parties disagreed 
over what the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged.76 Specifically at issue was 
whether the complaint alleged theft of information that included social 
security numbers and credit card numbers or merely customer names, 
addresses, and subscriber ID numbers.77 The district court read the 
complaint to not include social security and credit card information.78 
Without these other forms of identifying data, the plaintiffs could not 
demonstrate how the hackers could steal the plaintiffs’ identities.79 
Therefore, the district court ruled that the injury was too speculative.80 In 
other words, the district court found the injury in fact was not “actual or 
imminent” because the hackers could not access these forms of 
identifying data.81  
 
 71. 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  
 72. 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 73. Id. at 622. 
 74. Id. at 623. 
 75. Id. at 623. In total the plaintiffs raised eleven different state-law causes of action. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 626.  
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On appeal, the D.C. Circuit disagreed and reversed the decision of the 
district court.82 A few factors went into the court’s decision. First, the 
district court erred by not reading the complaint to include social security 
numbers and credit card numbers.83 The complaint alleged the business 
collected all sorts of customer PII, and the plaintiffs’ defined PII to 
include patient credit cards and social security numbers in the complaint.84 
Therefore, since the court concluded that the complaint did include PII 
necessary for identity theft, the complaint then also plausibly alleged the 
breach could potentially expose customer information to identity theft.85 
Secondly, the court believed the facts in the case were quite distinct from 
Clapper, specifically because the plaintiffs’ alleged risks were not 
contingent upon the happenings of a series of possible events.86 Here, the 
hacker had already accessed the PII.87 Further, once the hack occurred, 
the court said it was far less speculative to infer both the hacker’s intent 
and ability to use the data for ill will.88 The court noted that “simply by 
virtue of the hack and the nature of the data . . . taken” a substantial harm 
existed.89  
Lastly, the Attias court made an important distinction regarding 
whether a plaintiff’s “self-imposed risk-mitigation costs” conferred 
standing to the plaintiff.90 After the data breach, the plaintiffs alleged that 
they reasonably spent money to protect their data by purchasing identity 
theft protection and monitoring services.91 Further, the plaintiffs incurred 
costs from time spent responding to the incident and monitoring their 
credit and accounts afterwards.92 By quoting part of the Clapper decision, 
the court concluded that “such self-imposed risk-mitigation costs, when 
‘incurred in response to a speculative threat,’ do not fulfill the injury 
requirement.”93 However, the court also noted that plaintiffs can use these 
costs to “satisfy the redressability requirement, when combined with a 
risk of future harm that is substantial enough to qualify as an injury in 
 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 627. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 628. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 628-29. Quoting the seventh circuit, the court noted, “Why else would hackers break into 
a . . . database and steal consumers’ private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is sooner 
or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume the consumers’ identities.” Id. (quoting Remijas v. Neiman 
Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
 89. Id. at 629. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416-17 (2013)).  
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fact.”94 In this case, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that spending 
money to protect against the threat was reasonable.95 Overall, the court’s 
conclusion suggests that if the first element of standing—injury in fact—
is satisfied, then mitigation costs may be used to meet the third element 
of standing—redressability.  
III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Since the two Supreme Court cases discussed in Part II and the D.C. 
Circuit’s initial decision in Attias, the split has continued to be a highly 
contested issue, as discussed more fully in this Section. First, this Section 
examines the Fourth Circuit’s 2017 decision in Beck v. McDonald, where 
the court refused to grant standing for a risk of future identity theft 
claim.96 Then, this Section reviews the recent 2019 D.C. Circuit decision 
in AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.),97 in 
which the court granted standing based on a future risk of identity thief.98 
Together, the cases illustrate the current legal landscape of the circuit split 
by focusing on the similar factors the courts used when deciding when to 
grant standing to potential future victims of identity theft.  
A.  Beck v. McDonald 
The Beck decision dealt with two consolidated cases that arose out of 
a laptop computer and pathology reports that were either misplaced or 
stolen from a Veteran Affairs medical center.99 An internal investigation 
found that the laptop was “likely stolen” and that the medical center 
violated its own policies by leaving the client’s information stored on the 
laptop unencrypted.100 The plaintiffs were veterans who received 
treatment and healthcare from the VA medical center.101 The plaintiffs 
alleged violations of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Administrative 
Procedure Act.102 In response to the investigation, hospital officials 
notified every patient whose information may have been on the laptop or 
in the reports and offered a year of free credit monitoring to those possibly 
affected by the breach.103 Unsatisfied, the plaintiffs sued and tried to 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 97. 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  
 98. See Section III.B. 
 99. Beck, 848 F.3d at 266. 
 100. Id. at 267. 
 101. Id. at 266. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 267. 
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establish standing through (1) their increased risk of future identity theft 
and (2) the costs they incurred to protect themselves against identity 
theft.104  
After discovery, the district court granted the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III since 
they had not “submitted evidence sufficient [to show] they faced a 
‘certainly impending’ risk of identity theft.”105 Citing Clapper, the district 
court agreed that the claims were “too speculative” because they were 
“contingent on a claim of attenuated hypothetical events.”106 Specifically, 
the district court said the fact that “33% of those affected by the laptop 
theft would have their identities stolen” was not enough to demonstrate 
“a substantial risk of identity theft” or pass the “lesser standard” of 
“substantial risk.”107 Since the court considered the threat of future 
identity theft merely speculative, it followed that the court believed that 
the plaintiffs purchasing credit monitoring services “did not amount to an 
injury-in-fact because they were taken solely ‘to mitigate speculative 
harm.’”108  
The Fourth Circuit conducted a de novo review of the district court’s 
decision.109 After review, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court 
and held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing.110 The focus of the 
court’s inquiry was whether the plaintiffs met the first element of Article 
III standing: injury in fact.111 The court analyzed two potential theories 
proposed by the plaintiff for standing: “(1) increased risk of future identity 
theft and (2) costs of protecting against the same” under both the certainly 
impending standard and the “substantial risk” standard.112  
In its analysis of the increased risk of future identity theft under the 
certainly impending standard, the court specifically discussed the current 
circuit split.113 In the court’s opinion, the facts of Beck were 
distinguishable from the cases of other circuits that granted standing 
based on future risk of identity theft because those cases had “common 
allegations that sufficed to push the threatened injury of future identity 
theft beyond the speculative to the sufficiently imminent.”114 As an 
 
 104. Id. at 266-67. 
 105. Id. at 268. 
 106. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013)).  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 269. 
 110. Id. at 267. 
 111. Id. at 270.  
 112. Id. at 273. 
 113. Id. (noting the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits granting standing and the First and Third 
Circuits denying standing).  
 114. Id. at 274.  
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example, the court noted that in Galaria,115 Remijas,116 and Pisciotta,117 
the hackers intentionally targeted the personal information that was stolen 
in the data breach and at least one of the named plaintiffs had alleged 
actual “misuse or access” to the personal information by the thief.118 In 
Beck no such claims were made.119  
In reaching its holding, the court stated (1) there was no evidence that 
the PII stored on the laptop had been accessed and (2) the significant 
amount of time that passed since the incident made the risk more 
speculative.120 The court accepted the allegation that the laptop was 
stolen, but said “the mere theft of [the laptop], without more, cannot 
confer Article III standing.”121 Without more, the Fourth Circuit could not 
“assume that the thief targeted the stolen items for the personal 
information they contained.”122 Overall, it was clear the Fourth Circuit 
was reluctant to grant the plaintiffs standing without more evidence that 
illustrated the thief intended to misuse the stolen PII.  
The court also held that the plaintiffs fell short of the burden under the 
“substantial risk” standard.123 The plaintiffs alleged they faced a 
substantial risk of future identity theft for three reasons: (1) a third of all 
health-related data breaches resulted in identity theft; (2) the defendants 
already spent millions to mitigate the future risk; and (3) the defendants 
“effectively conceded” that the theft constituted a “reasonable risk” 
because they offered plaintiffs free credit monitoring for a year.124 In its 
“substantial risk” analysis, the court stated that statistics were insufficient 
to establish a substantial risk of harm.125  Further, in a footnote, the court 
demonstrated a reluctance to use general statistics because statistics are 
not particularized to the case at issue.126 The court also declined “to infer 
a substantial risk . . . from an organization’s offer to provide free credit 
monitoring services,”127 even though other courts had come to the 
opposite conclusion.128 Lastly, the court read Clapper to reject a 
 
 115. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. Appx. 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 116. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2015).  
 117. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 118. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 274-75.  
 121. Id. at 275. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 276. 
 126. Id. at 275-76, n.7 (“This general statistic says nothing about the risk arising out of any 
particular incident, nor does it address the particular facts of this case”). 
 127. Id. at 276. 
 128. Id. Footnote 8 of Beck acknowledges Galaria and Remijas came to the opposite conclusion. 
Id., n.8. 
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“reasonable risk” as being sufficient to meet the imminent requirement of 
an injury in fact.129 
In the final part of its analysis, the court discussed whether costs of 
mitigative measures incurred by plaintiffs could, by itself, confer 
standing.130 The court highlighted the circularity that plagues the 
reasoning to confer standing for this sole purpose, describing the claim as 
merely “a repackaged version” of the substantial risk analysis.131 
Essentially, the costs to mitigate the risks of future identity theft could 
confer standing only if there was a substantial risk of the identity theft 
occurring in the future. Therefore, costs of mitigating future damages, by 
itself, “simply put … cannot confer standing.”132 In many ways, the 
court’s reasoning echoed the Spokeo decision that came to the same 
conclusion.  
B.  AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data sec. Breach Litig.)133  
In June 2019, the D.C. Circuit again ruled on the circuit split. This time, 
the case concerned a government agency data breach by hackers.134 The 
data stolen included many types of sensitive information, such as 
birthdates, social security numbers, and fingerprints.135 In total, the breach 
affected over twenty-one million people.136  
The agency at issue was the U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
(“OPM”), which is the federal government’s chief human resources 
agency and maintains the electronic personnel files of federal employees 
and job applicants.137 Using stolen credentials from a third-party company 
that helped the agency with its background checks, cyberattackers hacked 
the network multiple times from 2013 to 2014.138 The cyberattacks were 
described as “sophisticated, malicious, and carried out to obtain sensitive 
information for improper use.”139 The OPM had experienced cyberattacks 
since 2009 and had been warned of serious deficiencies in their security 
 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 276, 277 (quoting Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (2015)).  
 133. 928 F. 3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 134. Id. at 49. 
 135. Id. at 49-50. Other information included criminal histories, physiological and emotional health, 
finances, residency details and passport information. It also included information about spouses and 
cohabitants. Id. 
 136. Id. at 49. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 50.  
 139. Id. at 52. 
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systems as far back as 2007.140 After announcing the breaches in 2015, 
OPM offered fraud monitoring, identity theft protection services, and 
insurance to those affected by the breach at no costs for either eighteen 
months or three years.141 
Despite the OPM’s offer, multiple suits arose across the country and 
were consolidated into two complaints against OPM.142 One complaint 
was brought by the American Federation of Government Employees 
(“Arnold plaintiffs”) and second complaint was brought by three 
members of the National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU”).143 
Arnold plaintiffs sought damages from OPM under Section 552a(e)(10) 
of the Privacy Act of 1974, while NTEU sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief and claimed a violation of their “constitutional right to 
information privacy.”144  
The district court dismissed both complaints for lack of standing.145 
First, the district court did not believe a “risk of future identity theft was 
either substantial or clearly impending” unless the plaintiffs experienced 
“out-of-pocket losses” from the “actual misuse of their data.”146 Secondly, 
even the plaintiffs who had their data actually misused lacked standing 
because the misuse was not tracible to the OPM’s data breaches 
particularly.147  
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that both sets of plaintiffs “cleared the 
low bar to establish their standing at the pleading stage.”148 The NTEU 
plaintiffs claimed a constitutional right to “information privacy.”149 When 
determining whether a plaintiff has standing, the court “must assume 
arguendo, the merits of his or her legal claim.”150 Therefore, the court 
assumed the NTEU plaintiffs had a right to information privacy. The court 
thought this right was violated when the cyberattackers stole the personal 
information of the plaintiffs.151 In its short analysis, the court concluded 
 
 140. Id. at 51. Further, in 2014 the Inspector General advised the agency to shut down the operating 
system due to existing security vulnerabilities. Id. 
 141. Id. at 50. (stating the time of free services depended on whether the specific individual’s social 
security number had been compromised in the data breach.). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 50-52. Arnold plaintiffs also brought claims against KeyPoint, the third-party company 
OPM used to conduct a majority of its background and security clearance, but this Article will not discuss 
those claims. Id. at 50-51. 
 145. Id. at 53.  
 146. Id. at 53. 
 147. Id. Essentially, there were possible alternatives beyond the OPM data breach that could have 
led to the subsequent misuse of the plaintiffs’ data. Id. 
 148. Id. at 61 (quoting Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). 
 149. Id. at 53. 
 150. Id. at 54 (citing Estate of Boyland v. Department of Agric., 913 F.3d 117, 123 (D.C. Cir 2019)).  
 151. Id.  
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the nature of the constitutional claim granted standing to the NTEU 
plaintiffs.152 On the other hand, the Arnold plaintiffs’ analysis was much 
more involved. The opinion broke down its analysis by discussing each 
of the three elements of standing.153 This Article’s analysis follows the 
same format.  
1.  Injury in Fact 
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis started by citing Attias as a reminder that 
the risk of future identity theft was already recognized as a “concrete and 
particularized injury.”154 However, based on Clapper and SBA List, the 
injury must also be clearly impending or substantial.155 The court 
compared the current case to Attias.156 In comparing the two cases, the 
D.C. Circuit focused on two factors in particular: “both the intent and the 
ability to use the data for ill (will).”157 The court concluded that in both 
cases, the intent of the hacker and the nature of the data stolen made the 
risk of future identity theft a substantial risk.158 
The court reasoned that the ability to use data for ill will essentially 
turned on the type of data that a hacker collected in its breach.159 After the 
data breach, hackers had “in their possession all information needed to 
steal the Arnold plaintiffs’ identities.”160 Based on the information taken, 
“[i]t hardly [took] a criminal mastermind to imagine how such 
information could be used to commit identity theft.”161 The Arnold 
plaintiffs’ claims that some members already experienced forms of 
identity theft further bolstered the plaintiffs’ inference that the nature of 
the data stolen contained sufficient information to successfully steal 
someone’s identity.162 Overall, combining the fact that the plaintiffs had 
already suffered identity fraud with the “obvious potential” for future 
fraud based on “the information stolen during the breaches” moved the 
risk of future identity theft from speculative to substantial.163   
The court’s intent analysis was premised on the Seventh Circuit’s 
 
 152. Id. at 55.  
 153. See supra Section II(A).  
 154. AFGE, 928 F.3d at 55.  
 155. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 156. Id. at 55-58.  
 157. Id. at 56.  
 158. Id. at 58.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 56. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (“several Arnold Plaintiffs also allege that unauthorized charges have appeared on their 
existing credit card and bank account statements since the breaches.”). 
 163. Id. at 58. 
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Remijas164 opinion, which determined that when a hacker breaks into a 
database and steals private consumer information, the purpose “is, sooner 
or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ 
identities.”165 The OPM argued that its case was different since (1) the 
attack was against the United States government and (2) the hackers had 
others goals which explained why the hackers wished to obtain the PII, 
such as national security and espionage objectives.166 The court found two 
problems with the OPM’s theories. First, the theories were based on the 
district courts’ “own extra-record research” which was not allowed.167 
Secondly, “espionage and identity theft [were] not mutually exclusive.”168 
The court noted that, at the pleading stage, it was not appropriate to sort 
out the most likely explanation for the hacker’s objective.169 Lastly, the 
court explained that in scenarios like the current case, where the plaintiff’s 
identity was already alleged to have been stolen, the importance of 
proving the hackers intent “becomes markedly less important” because 
possible damage from the breach had already manifested.170 
The court used hacker intent and subsequent misuse of stolen 
information to distinguish AFGE from the Third and Fourth Circuit 
decisions that did not grant standing due to future risk of identity theft.171 
In both of these cases that denied standing, the court concluded that (1) 
neither plaintiff alleged the theft intentionally accessed the private 
information and (2) there were no events of identity theft after the hack.172 
In AFGE, the court said the plaintiff alleged both the hacker’s intention 
and subsequent misuse.173 
Lastly, the court’s analysis of Beck forced the court to consider whether 
the time that elapsed since the breach should be considered as a factor, 
along with intent and the nature of the data stolen. It agreed with Beck 
that “as a general principle … as breaches fade further into the past, 
threatened injuries become more and more speculative.”174 The dissent 
believed that a gap of around two years between the attack and the 
 
 164. 794 F. 3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015). Remijas was also a data breach case where the Seventh 
Circuit granted standing to the plaintiffs based on a future risk of identity theft. In Remijas, hackers 
attacked the department store Neiman Marcus Group and stole customer data. Approximately 350,000 
cards were exposed to the hacker’s malware. Id. at 689-690. 
 165. AFGE, 928 F.3d at 56 (quoting Remijas 794 F.3d at 693).  
 166. Id. at 57.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 58.  
 171. Id. at 58-59.  
 172. Id. at 58. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 59.  
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subsequent misuse of the data was enough to “render the threat of future 
harm insubstantial.”175 The majority, however, was not willing to 
explicitly rule on the timing issue because (1) such “massive scale” data 
breaches were a “relatively new phenomenon” and (2) the type of 
information stolen was particularly sensitive.176 Overall, 
“notwithstanding the passage of time and the governmental character of 
the databases at issue,” the Arnold plaintiffs still offered enough evidence, 
at least at this stage in the proceeding, to demonstrate a substantial risk of 
future identity theft.177 
2.  Causation 
The D.C. Circuit overruled the district court’s finding that the Arnold 
plaintiffs did not meet the causation element of standing.178 Instead, the 
court had “little difficulty concluding” that the plaintiffs met their 
“relatively modest burden” of alleging traceability to the OPM data 
breach.179 Initially, the district court said the plaintiffs did not allege “any 
facts that plausibly connect” the misuse of the stolen data to the breaches 
of the OPM systems.180 However, the circuit court clarified that the 
district court used the wrong premise. For future risk of identity theft 
injury claims, instead of focusing on past attacks, the question is whether 
the injury is fairly traceable to the risk of future identity theft.181 Here, the 
data had been stolen, and the OPM had failed to secure its information 
systems, despite repeated warnings by the General Inspector.182 Further, 
the data stolen was enough by itself to enable several forms of identity 
theft.183 Together, the court found all of these reasons sufficient to meet 
the causation burden for standing by holding that the a future risk of 
identity theft was traceable to the OPM.184 
3.  Redressability 
The D.C. Circuit held that the plaintiffs could satisfy the redressability 
element by receiving compensation for their related mitigation expenses, 
 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 60. 
 179. Id. at 61. 
 180. Id. at 60.  
 181. Id. at 59-60. 
 182. Id. at 60. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 61. 
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if the plaintiff were to prevail on their claim.185  In AFGE, the related 
mitigation expenses were the costs the plaintiffs incurred to monitor their 
credit.186 The court cited Attias and used its logic that plaintiffs may be 
redressed for their monetary costs spent to protect themselves against a 
future risk as long as the spending was reasonable and the potential risk 
was substantial.187 The court already ruled that the potential risk was 
substantial in its injury in fact analysis. Therefore, the money plaintiffs 
spent to protect against identity theft was able to satisfy the redressability 
element. Since all three elements of standing were met by the plaintiffs, 
the court ruled that the plaintiffs “cleared the low bar to establish their 
standing at the pleading stage.”188  
IV.  DISCUSSION 
Together, the Beck and AFGE cases demonstrate how and why the 
federal circuit courts may fall on opposite sides of the split. The split 
remains highly contested in part due to a fear that granting standing to 
plaintiffs based on a future risk of identity theft will open the floodgates 
to massive class action litigation every time a data breach occurs.189 
However, taken together, the Beck and AFGE cases also illuminate the 
similarity of the factors that federal circuit courts use to decide whether 
to grant standing based of the risk of future identity theft. This Section 
shows that the factors the courts are weighing in these cases are the same 
regardless of how the courts ultimately rule. By using the factors that the 
federal circuit courts have already been using to justify their holdings, 
courts may be able to set a more cognizable threshold standard for 
standing in these types of cases. By doing so, courts will not need to turn 
away all plaintiffs who have been potentially injured while also avoiding 
a complete opening of the floodgates to litigation anytime there is a data 
breach. Instead, it is the facts and circumstances of each case, weighed 
with the factors the courts have already been using, that should determine 
whether or not a plaintiff is granted standing due to a risk of future identity 
theft. Next, this Section discusses the common factors used by the courts 
and explains how the factors are viewed similarly by the different courts. 
Last, this section proposes a line of questioning courts should adopt when 
deciding whether it is appropriate to grant standing based on a future risk 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 61. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Omer Tene, Neiman Marcus May Open the Floodgates for Breach Lawsuits, INT’L ASS’N OF 
PRIVACY PROFS. (IAPP) (Jul. 24, 2015), https://iapp.org/news/a/neiman-marcus-may-open-the-
floodgates-for-breach-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/Y9EB-YQXB].  
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of identity theft.  
A.  Intent of the Theft 
In analyzing standing, the Beck and AFGE courts prioritized discussing 
the intent of the theft. Also, both cases approvingly cited to Remijas’ 
language that “the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make 
fraudulent charges.”190 Ultimately, this language suggests that “bad 
intent” may be implied in a traditional computer system hacking case. 
However, the language of Remijas is specific to a hack, and not all risk of 
future identity theft claims result from a stereotypical hack. There are also 
cases such as Beck that involve the theft of something tangible that may 
also threaten individuals’ PII. For example, similar facts could arise from 
a stolen cell phone. In Beck, the court looked at the Sixth,191 Seventh,192 
and Ninth193 Circuit decisions that granted standing and specifically 
distinguished those case by noting the Beck theft did not possess the same 
intent that could be inferred from the stereotypical information systems 
hacks that were prevalent in the aforementioned cases.194 In cases where 
intent cannot be implied simply by the act of the hack itself, something 
else is needed to confer the malicious intent of the hacker.  
Both AFGE and Beck naturally looked next to whether any of the 
alleged victims’ PII had been wrongfully used. This is a logical next 
question to ask because, if PII was wrongfully used, then it again makes 
sense to infer that the thief stole the information to use it for wrongful 
purposes. In cases like Beck, it may be unclear whether the thief stole the 
laptop to sell the laptop itself and make money, or if the thief stole the 
laptop for the purpose of using the PII the thief knew was stored on the 
laptop. Clearly, the latter scenario is much more likely to lead to future 
identity theft than the former. Generally, both sides of the split seem to 
agree that intent may be inferred through the breach itself in most 
situations where a traditional information systems breach occurs. If, 
however, the facts and circumstances of the specific incident do not make 
this inference clear, courts should next look to whether any victims’ PII 
has already been wrongfully used. If misuse has occurred, courts may 
infer that, at a minimum, one of the hacker’s goals was to misuse the 
information, which again allows courts to infer a substantial risk.  
 
 190. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273 (4th Cir. 2017); AFGE, 928 F.3d at 56. 
 191. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. Appx. 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 192. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 193. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 194. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.  
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B.  Type of Information Stolen 
Both Beck and AFGE also looked at the type of information that was at 
risk of being used incorrectly to determine whether the future risk of 
identity theft was substantial. Often, a significant amount of PII obtained 
through the theft may already have been freely available through other 
methods, such as the public domain. For example, names and addresses 
are often already in the public domain through public records. Even 
information such as someone’s occupation or date of birth may be 
available from credit reports or social media websites such as Facebook 
or LinkedIn. The Spokeo Court specifically suggested (in the case of a 
statutory violation) that information such as a person’s zip code may not 
satisfy the concreteness demands of Article III because an inaccurate zip 
code alone was not a risk of real harm.195  
In the Eighth Circuit’s In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Security 
Breach Litigation196 decision, the court held that credit card information, 
with no other PII stolen, is not enough to confer standing under Article 
III.197 In that case, the court focused particularly on the types of PII data 
stolen to determine whether plaintiffs had standing.198 Essentially, the 
type of information stolen determines whether the degree of risk is 
sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement of standing.  
In Beck and AFGE, social security numbers were amongst the types of 
information stolen.199 Social security numbers, unlike zip codes, are 
generally considered incredibly private and often unlock the ability to 
perform a plethora of financial activities such as opening, closing, and 
accessing bank accounts, credit cards, and loans. From a practical 
standpoint, a stolen social security number is a much larger burden on 
potential victims because social security numbers are much harder PII to 
change once they are compromised. The AFGE court viewed social 
security numbers, in addition to the surmountable other types of PII 
stolen, as sufficient to allow the simple inference that the type of 
information stolen in the breach was adequate to successfully commit 
identity theft.200 The Beck court did not specifically comment on whether 
it believed the information on the laptop was sensitive enough to imply a 
risk is of future harm. However, the Beck court also did not attack the 
reasoning of the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit courts which did infer 
 
 195. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549-50 (2016).  
 196. 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 197. Id. at 771-72. (stating that credit card information was insufficient to support standing. 
Importantly, in that case, no other PII was allegedly stolen.). 
 198. Id. at 769-71. 
 199. Beck, 848 F.3d at 268; AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 928 
F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 200. AFGE, 928 F.3d at 60. 
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that the information stolen was sufficiently sensitive. Instead, Beck 
focused on the intent of the hacker to distinguish the cases.201 Therefore, 
between the two cases, it appears that social security numbers, along with 
some other types of stolen PII, are concrete enough to qualify as injury in 
fact. However, the Beck court’s reasoning seemed to prioritize the thief’s 
intent over the type of PII stolen by the thief.202  
C.  Timing 
Perhaps the most controversial factor that the courts considered in Beck 
and AFGE was the role that the passage of time plays as a factor for 
determining whether a future risk is substantial. In their respective 
opinions, both circuit courts agreed that “as a general principle …  as 
breaches fade further into the past … threatened injuries become more 
and more speculative.”203 The courts’ statements on timing suggest that 
both courts understood timing to minimally be a factor worthy of 
consideration by courts, before either granting or denying standing. 
Although there may be an inferred agreement that courts believe timing 
should be a factor, both courts’ opinions offer minimal guidance for 
understanding how significant of a factor the respective courts believe 
timing should be when deciding whether a plaintiff has standing.  
The Beck opinion noted it had been over three years since the initial 
data breaches and still no evidence existed of actual identity theft.204 Since 
the thief in Beck was not a traditional information systems hack, but 
instead involved the theft of a laptop, the court could not infer the thief’s 
intent by the act of the theft itself, like it suggested one could with cases 
involving a traditional data hack.205 The court then used the passage of 
time as a detrimental fact against the plaintiffs. The court believed the 
prolonged timespan between the theft and the case, without an incident of 
identity theft, made the inference that the thief’s intent was to use the PII 
for identity theft a much more speculative inference. Essentially, the Beck 
court used the passage of time as a weighing factor when intent of the 
thief could not be inferred by the act of the theft itself.  
Lastly, it should be noted that the Beck court only discussed passage of 
time under its “certainly impending” analysis.206 In many ways, it makes 
sense that the passage of time may play a larger role determining whether 
a plaintiff has standing in cases that involve the stricter “certainly 
 
 201. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274-75. 
 202. Id. 
 203. AFGE, 928 F.3d at 59. (quoting Beck, 848 F.3d at 275). 
 204. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274.  
 205. See discussion supra Section IV.A.  
 206. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274-75.  
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impending” standard, compared to the more laxed “substantial risk” 
standard. Under the Clapper analysis, it is evident that at least part of what 
makes “certainly impending” a higher bar for plaintiffs to pass is that 
there in an immediacy to something being “certainly impending” as 
opposed to there merely being a “substantial risk” of something 
happening in the future. 
The AFGE court analyzed the passage of time factor under facts that 
the court believed allowed it to infer intent of the theft by the act of the 
hack itself. Therefore, the AFGE court examined timing as an 
independent factor, instead of merely being a factor used to infer a thief’s 
intent, like the Beck court did. Although the court still admitted passage 
of time played some role in determining a future risk of identity theft, 
overall the court was reluctant to give the factor much weight. First, the 
court mostly declined to analyze the issue by stating it believed it was too 
early to make a determination regarding timing because of the large scale 
of the data breach and the relative novelty of large-scale data breaches, 
generally.207 Essentially, the court believed it did not possess enough 
knowledge about the general workings of data breaches and therefore did 
not want to make any substantive rulings on data breaches related to how 
the passage of time may or may not affect the substantiality of the risk of 
future identity theft. Second, the only significant position the court held 
on timing at all was that it was unpersuaded that two years between the 
cyberattacks and the lawsuit was a long enough passage of time to make 
the threat insubstantial.208 All in all, AFGE did acknowledge that the 
passage of time may play a role in the standing analysis but limited the 
factor by (1) stating two years was not a long enough passage of time to 
affect the analysis, and (2) showing a general reluctance to giving the 
factor much weight.209  
D.  Certainly Impending v. Substantial Risk: Which Standard Applies? 
The previously discussed factors of intent, timing, and type of PII 
stolen from the theft likely allow for much more elastic inferences when 
analyzed under the “substantial risk” standard versus the “certainly 
impending” standard. Since Clapper, courts have suggested the certainly 
impending test may only relate to matters of national security or facial 
challenges.210 Courts’ treatment of the two standards since Clapper 
unquestionably shows a willingness to use the substantial risk standard in 
 
 207. AFGE, 928 F.3d at 59. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Stevens v. Zappos.com, Inc. (In re Zappos.com, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 884 
F.3d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2018).  
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lieu of its alternative.211 The Supreme Court could clarify when each 
standard is preferred by granting a writ of certiorari on a related case. 
Without a Supreme Court clarification, appellate courts have consistently 
shown a respect for the substantial risk standard by often using the 
standard for their standing analyses. It is almost impossible for 
individuals to know exactly when their PII may become compromised 
after a data breach. Further, it is also nearly impossible for a victim to 
know whether a thief intends to misuse their PII or what a thief’s 
comprehension skills are for both understanding and wrongfully using an 
individual’s data. Due to an alleged victim’s inability to know these facts, 
it is logical, in most cases, to apply the more lenient standard when 
determining standing. Lastly, the SBA List decision following Clapper 
also further illustrates the Supreme Court’s willingness to use the more 
lenient substantial risk standard.  Together, these factors make the 
substantial risk standard the desired standard for courts to use when 
determining standing based on a future risk of identity theft.  
E.  Resulting Standard for Courts Moving Forward 
Using the factors previously discussed, the circuit courts’ rulings in 
Beck and AFGE offer guidance for other courts to analyze the circuit split 
without simply granting or denying standing in all cases involving a future 
risk of identity theft. In fact, the cases demonstrate that as circuit courts’ 
jurisprudence on the split has continued to evolve, consistent factors have 
arisen in appellate decisions and may now be synthetized and used to 
analyze the split henceforward. The following is an order of questions 
courts should ask to determine if a plaintiff has standing based on a future 
risk of identity theft.  
First, a court must figure out which standard to apply: “certainly 
impending” or “substantial risk.” Based on Clapper, courts know that if 
there is a question of national security or a separation of powers question 
at issue, courts should apply the certainly impending standard. A question 
of separation of powers is more likely to arise in a case that facially 
challenges a statute. Naturally, a facial challenge positions a court against 
a decision by Congress. In an effort to show deference to the decisions of 
Congress, it makes sense to require that plaintiffs pass a stricter standing 
requirement in those cases. Based on a broader implementation of 
Clapper, the certainly impending standard could be required in any cases 
involving the federal government. However, AFGE involved a federal 
government agency and the court did not require plaintiffs to pass the 
 
 211. As previously discussed, SBA List, Attias, AFGE, Remijas, and Zappos.com, Inc. all use the 
“substantial risk” standard in their analyses.   
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stricter certainly impending standard. Therefore, moving forward, other 
courts should follow suit and freely apply the substantial risk standard in 
all cases that do not involve national security or separation of powers 
issues, like the Supreme Court did in SBA List.  
After deciding which standard applies, the type of information stolen 
serves as a gateway to the rest of the standing analysis. Both Beck and 
AFGE dealt with the theft of social security numbers along with other 
types of identifying PII. Taking a holistic view, courts need to simply ask 
if the type of PII stolen, judged altogether, allow for a relatively 
competent thief to commit identity theft. After Beck and AFGE, courts 
should consider social security numbers with minimal other PII sufficient 
for a relatively competent theft to commit identity theft. Whether credit 
card numbers or bank account numbers along with other pieces of PII pass 
the same test is likely dependent on the facts and circumstances of the 
theft and the intent of the thief.  
Next, courts should turn to analyzing the intent of the thief. Based on 
Beck’s and AFGE’s favorable treatment of the logic used in Remijas, if 
the theft occurred via a traditional data hack, ill-will on behalf of the 
hacker may be implied. If the theft occurred by means other than a data 
hack, then courts should next determine whether some of the alleged 
victims’ information was actually misused after the theft. In AFGE, later 
actual misuse was a supporting factor for the plaintiffs. In Beck, no 
evidence of a later misuse was a negating factor for the plaintiffs. Overall, 
if PII was stolen, and later misused, then standing should be granted. 
On the other hand, if there has not been any later misuse, courts should 
then turn to the passage of time factor. The AFGE court examined the 
passage of time as a possible independent factor. But by stating that the 
court did not believe it was in a position to substantially rule on timing, 
due to the relatively contemporaneous nature of large-scale data breaches, 
the effect was to essentially neuter the factor of any persuasive weight. 
However, the Beck analysis may offer a more natural fit for where to 
structure timing as a factor in the overall standing analysis; timing is best 
examined when the thief’s intent cannot be easily inferred by the act. If a 
significant time has passed since the act, no misuse of the information has 
been reported by any of the plaintiffs, and the intent of the thief may not 
be inferred based on the type of theft, then courts should follow the 
decision of the Beck court and not grant standing to the plaintiff.  
Notwithstanding the above guidance, questions still persist regarding 
how to best determine when the passage of time becomes significant. 
Neither the Beck nor AFGE decision provides much guidance for how to 
determine when the amount of time elapsed since a theft becomes 
significant. Based on AFGE, two years may not be enough time to be 
considered significant, at least when dealing with a large-scale data 
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breach that potentially affects millions of people’s PII. The laptop in Beck 
was stolen about three and a half years prior to when the Fourth Circuit 
heard the case and affected approximately 7,400 patients.212  Together, it 
may be deduced that the passage of time factor may be elastic, depending 
on the amount of PII stolen and people affected. As guideposts, two years 
may not be long enough, but more than three years could be considered a 
significant amount of time.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
As the number of data breaches in the United States continue to rise, 
surely so will the amount of litigation concerning how to best make 
victims of subsequent identity theft whole.  As individuals continue to 
adapt to the rapidly progressing digital age, individuals will become even 
more keenly aware of the potential financial risks that threaten them after 
their PII is stolen. People who find out their PII has been compromised 
will likely continue to file claims against the entities who failed to protect 
their PII.  
Those realities put federal courts in a tough spot: do federal courts flood 
the courts by encouraging individuals to take proactive measures to 
protect themselves from potentially significant financial losses and grant 
standing based off of a future risk of identity theft? Or do courts protect 
the judicial systems from a flood of litigation dealing with the growing 
issue by not granting standing to plaintiffs until actual identity theft 
occurs? The Supreme Court has not directly resolved this issue.  
Thankfully though, recent decisions falling on either side of the circuit 
split have provided guidance as to what factors matter most when federal 
courts resolve cases based on a future risk of identity theft. The type of 
information stolen and the thief’s intent have surfaced as the two most 
important factors. Furthermore, within intent, courts may look to whether 
identity theft has already occurred amongst the plaintiffs and the passage 
of time to determine if the risk is “certainly impending” or a “substantial 
risk.” By potentially leaving the door to litigation open, one may argue 
that the courts will still be swamped with litigation. However, by adopting 
the framework of questions discussed in Section IV, courts should be able 
to clarify the factors and effectively limit the amount of overall litigation 
on the subject, while still allowing plaintiffs who proactively incurred 
costs to mitigate future damages the ability to be made whole for costs 




 212. Beck, 848 F.3d at 267.  
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